



Pin the Tail on . . . Somebody: The Kansas 
Supreme Court’s Decision to Expose Firearms 
Dealers to Unwarranted Liability* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Kansas Supreme Court’s recent decision in Shirley v. Glass
1
 
raised the degree of care applicable to Kansas firearms dealers conduct-
ing sales, which in turn elevated the risk of liability for selling firearms 
to such a high level as to cast considerable doubt on whether Kansas 
firearms dealers can continue their trade.
2
  In Shirley, the Kansas Su-
preme Court reversed the Kansas Court of Appeals, holding that firearms 
dealers must exercise the “highest degree of care” when conducting fire-
arms sales.
3
  As a result, Kansas firearms dealers may be liable for sell-
ing a firearm to an incompetent purchaser if a jury determines the dealer 
had even the slightest possible reason to know of the purchaser’s incom-
petence.
4
  This proposition seems fair until one considers that the su-
preme court’s holding requiring firearms dealers to exercise the “highest 
degree of care” in determining whether a purchaser is competent to pos-
sess a firearm came without instructions.
5
  The highest degree of care is 
one feather away from negligence per se,
6
 and firearms dealers have been 
given an expectation with no guidance as to how to live up to it. 
This Note analyzes the supreme court’s imposition of the highest de-
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 1.  Shirley v. Glass, 308 P.3d 1 (Kan. 2013). 
 2.  See id. at 9 (noting the Kansas Court of Appeals’ concerns that “a heightened standard of 
care for merchants might preclude merchants from being able to sell firearms because of the threat of 
liability”).  
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id.  
 6.  See Shirley, 241 P.3d 134, 155 (Kan. Ct. App. 2010), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 308 P.3d 1 
(Kan. 2013) (“[T]he ‘highest degree of care’ standard [] would make every licensed gun dealer neg-
ligent per se every time a statutorily ineligible gun purchaser, no matter how deceitful, bought a fire-
arm.”); Wroth v. McKinney, 373 P.2d 216, 218 (Kan. 1962) (“As the hazard from the use or threat-
ened use of dangerous instrumentalities increases, the responsibility of the person employing them 
becomes stricter, and in extreme cases, may be the equivalent of insurance of safety.”). 
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gree of care on Kansas firearms dealers conducting firearm sales, and 
concludes that the imposition of such a high standard is improper be-
cause it exposes prudent, blameless dealers to unwarranted liability.  The 
ordinary degree of care standard is preferable because it already holds 
culpable dealers liable without producing the higher standard’s undesira-
ble effect of exposing responsible dealers to liability.  Part II of this Note 
provides the facts of Shirley and its procedural history.  Part II also de-
lineates the history of negligent entrustment, its application to firearms, 
and the degree of care that accompanies its application.  Part III critiques 
the Kansas Supreme Court’s decision to apply the highest degree of care 
standard to Kansas firearms dealers and warns of the harm it will inflict 
on innocent businesses.  Part IV concludes that the Kansas Supreme 
Court was wrong to elevate the care required of Kansas firearms dealers 
from an ordinary degree to the highest degree, and argues in the alterna-
tive for imposition of only an ordinary degree of care standard. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Shirley v. Glass
7
 
The gravamen of the plaintiff’s claim in Shirley was that the defend-
ants sold a firearm to a purchaser they knew or should have known was 
incompetent to possess it.
8
  The tragic series of events that gave rise to 
Shirley culminated in the death of eight-year-old Zeus Graham at the 
hand of his own father.
9
  Zeus’s father, Russell Graham, had a history of 
violence towards Zeus’s mother, Elizabeth Shirley.
10
  On multiple occa-
sions, Graham assaulted and threatened Shirley.  Most notably, in July 
2003, Graham called Shirley to pick up her son from his house.
11
  When 
Shirley arrived, Graham viciously attacked her, causing Shirley to obtain 
a protection-from-abuse order.
12
  Shortly after these events, Graham 




                                                          
 7.  Shirley, 308 P.3d 1.  The case was decided on summary judgment, so the court “review[ed] 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,” plaintiff, and found the facts as 
they are relayed in this section.  Id. at 3. 
 8.  Id. at 3–4. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. at 3. 
 11.  Id.  
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
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Though Graham was a convicted felon and therefore statutorily inel-
igible to purchase a firearm, on September 5, 2003, he enlisted his 
grandmother to accompany him to the Baxter Springs Gun & Pawn Shop 
to purchase a shotgun.
14
  Once inside the pawnshop, Graham told the 
shop’s owners, Joe and Patsy George, that he had called earlier about 
buying a shotgun for his children to use for dove hunting.
15
  Graham rep-
resented to his grandmother that the shotgun would remain at her 
house.
16
  Both Graham and his grandmother held the shotgun, and Gra-
ham indicated they would take it.
17
  Graham asked for ammunition and a 
cleaning kit as well.
18
  The shop owner asked Graham whether he had 
“been a good boy,” to which Graham replied that he had a felony.
19
  The 
owner then said, “Let’s see if grandma has been a good girl.”
20
 
Graham’s grandmother completed Form 4473, which is used to de-
termine whether a prospective firearm purchaser is a felon or otherwise 
prohibited from completing the purchase.  She inserted her name as the 
buyer, despite the form’s warning that “[y]ou are not the actual buyer if 
you are acquiring the firearm(s) on behalf of another person,” and that 
purchasing a firearm on behalf of another is a felony.
21
  Graham’s 
grandmother did not read the form or answer its “yes/no questions be-
cause, in her view, she was not purchasing the gun.”
22
  Even so, she suc-
cessfully passed the required background check and was given youth 
gun-safety material.
23
  Graham presented the cash to pay for the transac-
tion, though it is unclear whether it was he or his grandmother who ulti-
mately gave the money to the shop owner.
24
  Regardless, Graham left the 
pawn shop with the shotgun in hand,
25
 and took it with him when his 
grandmother dropped him off at home.
26
  Shortly before midnight on the 
                                                          
 14.  Id.  
 15.  Id. at 4. 
 16.  Id. at 3. 
 17.  Id. at 4. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id.  Graham’s grandmother reported this conversation.  Joe, however, denied the conversa-
tion ever took place.  Id. 
 20.  Id.  “Joe later explained that the reason for asking the question was to lighten the mood 
with a joke, while Patsy explained that the question was not a joke but was intended to determine 
whether a purchaser could legally buy a gun.”  Id.  
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. 
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same day, Graham called Shirley.
27
  He told her about getting a gun with 
his grandmother’s help, and that he would shoot Zeus if she did not come 
over to talk.
28
  Shirley’s boyfriend contacted the police, who instructed 
Shirley to remain at her home.
29
  Shirley later called Graham back and 
left a message that she was coming over.
30
  Sadly, around the same time 
that Shirley was leaving the message, Graham shot and killed Zeus be-
fore turning the shotgun on himself.
31
 
Shirley sued Baxter Springs Gun & Pawn Shop, along with the 
Georges, for negligently selling a firearm to Graham’s grandmother, 
knowing the firearm was for Graham (who was not competent to pur-
chase a firearm because of his admitted felon status).
32
  Shirley relied on 
the tort of negligent entrustment as the legal foundation for her claim, 
which provides that one who supplies a chattel to someone he knows or 
should know is incompetent to use it is liable for the harm it causes to 
another.
33
  The district court granted the Georges’ motion for summary 
judgment,
34
 and Shirley appealed.  The Kansas Court of Appeals af-
firmed the district court’s rejection of her negligence per se claim, but 
reversed the district court’s rejection of her negligent entrustment claim 
against the pawn shop and the Georges.
35
 
Shirley appealed, asking the Kansas Supreme Court to review the 
court of appeals’ rejection of her negligence per se claim as well as the 
degree of care applicable to firearms dealers conducting sales in her ac-
tion for simple negligence.
36
  The supreme court construed Shirley’s neg-
ligence per se claim to be a negligent entrustment claim, and affirmed the 




While the supreme court agreed that negligent entrustment ought to 
                                                          
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Shirley v. Glass, 244 P. 3d 134, 141 (Kan. Ct. App. 2010), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 308 
P.3d 1 (Kan. 2013). 
 30.  Shirley, 308 P.3d at 4. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. Shirley also brought negligent entrustment and breach of fiduciary duty claims against 
Graham’s grandmother, but dropped them when the grandmother was diagnosed with Alzheimer’s 
disease.  Id. 
 33.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 390 (1965). 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Shirley v. Glass, 241 P.3d 134, 153, 145  (Kan. Ct. App. 2010), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 
308 P.3d 1 (Kan. 2013). 
 36.  Shirley, 308 P.3d at 5. 
 37.  Id. at 9. 
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apply to the sale of a firearm, it starkly disagreed with the court of ap-
peals’ refusal to impose the highest degree of care on firearms dealers 
conducting sales.
38
  Despite the court of appeals’ prediction that the 
higher standard would expose firearms dealers to liability even where 
they had no reason to know that a customer was incompetent to purchase 
a firearm,
39
 the supreme court strongly asserted that it would neither shy 
away from nor limit prior rulings requiring those in control of firearms to 
exercise the highest degree of care to prevent firearms from falling into 
the hands of those who are legally incompetent to possess such weap-
ons.
40
  As a result of the Shirley decision, Kansas firearms dealers are 
now held to the highest degree of care when conducting firearms sales.
41
 
B. Negligent Entrustment 
The tort of negligent entrustment was first recognized in Kansas by 
the supreme court in Priestly v. Skourup in 1935.
42
  In Priestly, a pedes-
trian who had been struck by a young driver sued the owner of the car on 
the ground that, as the driver’s father, the owner knew his son was a 
careless driver yet negligently entrusted him with the vehicle anyways.
43
  
Since Priestly, negligent entrustment claims in Kansas have developed to 
encompass four elements: “(1) an entrustment of a chattel, (2) to an in-
competent entrustee, (3) with knowledge or reason to know of the entrus-
tee’s incompetence and, (4) the entrustee’s incompetence while using the 




Historically, most negligent entrustment claims in Kansas were 
based on persons supplying vehicles to known careless drivers.
45
  In 
2006, the Kansas Court of Appeals first considered whether negligent en-
trustment may properly apply to the sale of chattels in Estate of Pember-
                                                          
 38.  Shirley, 308 P.3d at 8–10; Shirley, 241 P.3d at 154–56. 
 39.  Shirley, 241 P.3d at 156. 
 40.  Shirley, 308 P.3d at 9. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  45 P.2d 852, 854 (Kan. 1935) (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 390 (1934)). 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Martell v. Driscoll, 302 P.3d 375, 382 (Kan. 2013). 
 45.  Estate of Pemberton v. John’s Sports Ctr., Inc., 135 P.3d 174, 188 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006) 
(citing Fogo v. Steele, 304 P.2d 451, 452–53 (Kan. 1956) (“The vast majority of [negligent entrust-
ment] cases are where the owner has permitted a known reckless or incompetent person to use his or 
her vehicle.”)).  See also, e.g., Richardson v. Erwin, 255 P.2d 641, 644 (Kan. 1953) (negligent en-
trustment of automobile); Pennington v. Davis–Child Motor Co., 57 P.2d 428, 430 (Kan. 1936) 
(same).  
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ton v. John’s Sports Center, Inc.
46
  However, the Pemberton court ulti-
mately did not resolve the question because it found that, even if the tort 
were applicable, the plaintiff could not prove all of the required ele-
ments.
47
  While ultimately leaving the question unanswered, the court 
emphasized that the commentary accompanying the Restatement (Se-
cond) of Torts codification of negligent entrustment in § 390 “clearly 
states that it ‘applies to sellers.’”
48
 
Outside Kansas, some states have applied negligent entrustment to 
the sale of chattels,
49
 while others have refused to do so.
50
  In its Shirley 
decision, the court of appeals sided with those states who recognized 
negligent entrustment in the sale of chattels context.  In extending the 
tort to encompass the sale of chattels, specifically the sale of firearms, 
the court of appeals held that “the special duty under Section 390, to not 
give control of firearms or ammunition to a person whom the firearms 
dealer knows is incompetent or incapable . . . of using those items care-
fully, has been extended to firearms dealers.”
51
  Despite some opposition 
to this rule,
52
 the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals’ 




C. Degree of Care Applicable to Kansas Firearms Dealers 
The extension of negligent entrustment to firearms sales begged the 
                                                          
 46.  135 P.3d at 187–88.  To that point, Kansas courts had never applied negligent entrustment 
to the sale of chattels, and had even held that a seller cannot negligently entrust a vehicle to a buyer 
once the sale is complete.  Id. at 188; Kirk v. Miller, 644 P.2d 486, 490 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982).  
 47.  Pemberton, 135 P.3d at 188. 
 48.  Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 390 cmt. a (1965)).  
 49.  E.g., Howard Bros. of Phenix City, Inc. v. Penley, 492 So. 2d 965, 969 (Miss. 1986) (store 
had a duty to have some procedures in place to prevent incompetent people from obtaining fire-
arms); Rains v. Bend of the River, 124 S.W.3d 580, 597 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (recognizing negli-
gent entrustment in the sale of firearms and ammunition); Bernethy v. Walt Failor’s, Inc., 653 P.2d 
280, 283 (Wash. 1982) (recognizing negligent entrustment in firearms sales).  
 50.  E.g., Fluker v. Lynch, 938 S.W.2d 659, 662 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (refusing to recognize 
negligent entrustment claim where dealer allegedly sold vehicle to intoxicated driver); Salinas v. 
Gen. Motors Corp., 857 S.W.2d 944, 949 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (refusing to recognize negligent en-
trustment claim against automobile manufacturer). 
 51.  Shirley v. Glass, 241 P.3d 134, 145 (Kan. Ct. App. 2010), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 308 
P.3d 1 (Kan. 2013). 
 52.  For an argument against applying negligent entrustment to the sale of chattels, specifically 
to firearms sales, see Andrew D. Holder, Comment, Negligent Entrustment: The Wrong Solution to 
the Serious Problem of Illegal Gun Sales in Kansas (Shirley v. Glass, 241 P.3d 134 (Kan. Ct. App. 
2010)), 50 WASHBURN L.J. 743 (2011). 
 53.  Shirley v. Glass, 308 P.3d 1, 9 (Kan. 2013). 
  
2014] FIREARMS DEALER’S UNWARRANTED LIABILITY 1407 
question of what degree of care firearms dealers must exercise to suffi-
ciently carry out their duties under the law.  Naturally, because the Kan-
sas Supreme Court recently affirmed the extension of negligent entrust-
ment to firearms sales, there is no lengthy case law addressing this issue.  
However, there is an established doctrine pertaining to “dangerous in-
strumentalities.”
54
  The doctrine proceeds on the logic that some instru-
mentalities are inherently dangerous, and thus require the possessor to 
exercise a higher degree of care to satisfy the reasonable care standard.
55
  
While an actor is always required to exercise “reasonable care,” the de-
gree of care constituting reasonable care depends on the dangerousness 
of the situation.
56
  Accordingly, “reasonable care” may require the actor 
to employ an “ordinary degree of care” or the “highest degree of care,” 
depending on the dangerousness of the situation.
57
  For example, the 
highest degree of care is required for reasonable care when using inher-







  Firearms have also long been held 
to be dangerous instrumentalities that command the highest degree of 
care from their owners or controllers.
61
  However, the dangerous instru-
mentality cases involving firearms so far have only addressed private 




Kansas courts have not clearly articulated the difference between the 
ordinary degree of care and the highest degree of care standards beyond 
stating that a difference exists.
63
  The distinction has puzzled tort law ex-
perts Professors William Westerbeke and Stephen McAllister: 
                                                          
 54.  See Long v. Turk, 962 P.2d 1093, 1096 (Kan. 1998) (describing the “dangerous instrumen-
talities” doctrine). 
 55.  Id. at 1097. 
 56.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §298 cmt. b (1965). 
 57.  Id.  (“[T]he care which it is reasonable to require of the actor varies with the danger in-
volved in his act, and is proportionate to it.”). 
 58.  Cope v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 391 P.2d 107, 112 (Kan. 1964). 
 59.  Sternbock v. Consol. Gas Utils. Corp., 98 P.2d 162, 167 (Kan. 1940). 
 60.  Clark v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours Powder Co., 146 P. 320, 321 (Kan. 1915). 
 61.  Wroth v. McKinney, 373 P.2d 216, 219 (Kan. 1962) (citing Clark, 146 P. at 321). 
 62.  See, e.g., Wood v. Groh, 7 P.3d 1163, 1166–67 (Kan. 2000) (son removed screws from 
father’s gun cabinet, accessed handgun, and shot another minor); Long v. Turk, 962 P.2d 1093, 
1094–95 (Kan. 1998) (son took father’s gun from cabinet and fatally shot another minor); Wroth, 
373 P.2d at 219 (plumber took 4-year-old son along to work in defendant’s house, where his son 
found defendant’s loaded pistol in the house and killed himself).  
 63.  William E. Westerbeke & Stephen R. McAllister, Survey of Kansas Tort Law: Part I, 49 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 1037, 1065 (2001). 
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The supreme court [in Wood v. Groh] emphasized that an important 
difference exists between the reasonable care standard . . . and the 
‘highest degree of care’ standard defining the duty to control dangerous 
weapons.  Yet the court never explained how the ‘highest degree of 
care’ differs from [ordinary] care.  An examination of the ‘highest de-
gree of care’ standard in the high power line cases in Kansas seems to 
suggest that ‘highest degree of care’ is simply another way to describe 
a reasonable care standard in which the heightened dangerousness of 
the instrumentality requires commensurately heightened precautions in 
order to satisfy reasonable care under all the circumstances.
64
 
Comment b of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 298 supports this 
proposition because it provides that “[t]he care required is always rea-
sonable care.  This standard never varies, but the care which it is reason-
able to require of the actor varies with the danger involved in his act . . . . 
The greater the danger, the greater the care which must be exercised.”
65
  
This Note does not purport to sort out the care-standard definitions in 
Kansas.  It suffices to note that “[t]here is a substantial difference be-
tween the . . . ordinary care [and] the highest degree of care [standards],” 
such that instructing the jury on the wrong standard requires reversal.
66
  
Whether courts refer to the care required of a firearms dealer as “the 
highest degree of care,” or simply assert that transacting in firearms is of 
amplified dangerousness and requires tremendous precautions, the result-
ing duty is the same: the highest degree of care requires significantly 




D.  The Degree of Care in Shirley  
In Shirley, plaintiff Shirley argued to the Kansas Court of Appeals 
that two Kansas Supreme Court decisions, Long v. Turk
68
 and Wood v. 
Groh,
69
 supported extending the highest degree of care to firearms deal-
ers who conduct the firearms sales at issue in negligent entrustment ac-
tions.
70
  Both cases involved minors accessing their father’s firearm and 
                                                          
 64.  Id. 
 65.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 298 cmt. b (1965). 
 66.  Wood, 7 P.3d at 1169. 
 67.  See id. (noting that “[t]here is a substantial difference between . . . ordinary care [and] the 
highest degree of care”). 
 68.  Long v. Turk, 962 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1998). 
 69.  Wood, 7 P.3d at 1163. 
 70.  Shirley v. Glass, 241 P.3d 134, 154 (Kan. Ct. App. 2010), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 308 
P.3d 1 (Kan. 2013). 
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consequently injuring another.  In both cases, the supreme court ruled 
that the highest degree of care applies to firearm owners when carrying 
out their duties to keep their firearms from an incompetent person’s pos-
session.
71
  The court of appeals distinguished the cases as involving “an 
adult’s duty to safeguard handguns from minors,” and rejected Shirley’s 
argument that the cases instruct that the highest degree of care should 
apply to firearms dealers conducting sales.
72
  The court of appeals rea-
soned that the Shirley facts involve a different situation: a merchant who 
sells guns to customers in the ordinary course of business.
73
  Drawing on 
this distinction, the court of appeals further reasoned that while an adult 
must exercise the highest degree of care to prevent a minor from obtain-
ing possession of the adult’s gun, a firearms dealer is not required to “ex-
ercise the ‘highest degree of care’ to protect the general public from the 
misuse of the gun.”
74
 
After rejecting Shirley’s argument that the highest degree of care ap-
plies to firearms dealers conducting sales, the court of appeals expressed 
its concern that adopting such a care standard would make firearms deal-
ers negligent per se each and every time they sold a firearm to a statutori-
ly ineligible purchaser, regardless of how deceptive or cunning the pur-
chaser, and regardless of how innocent and careful the dealer.
75
  The 
court hypothesized that applying the highest degree of care to firearms 
dealers might require them 
to investigate whether the firearms purchaser had other people living in 
the home, whether those people had any violent tendencies or prior fel-
ony convictions, whether there were any children in the home, whether 
the purchaser had a secure gun cabinet in which to lock away his gun, 




The court expressed concern over whether a firearms dealer could even 
continue his business with the threat of liability the highest degree of 
care standard would impose upon him.
77
 
In refusing to extend the highest degree of care to firearms dealers 
                                                          
 71.  Id. (citing Long, 962 P.2d at 1094–96 and Wood, 7 P.3d 1163, 1166, 1169). 
 72.  Shirley, 241 P.3d at 155. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 75.  Id. 
 77.    Id.  
 77.  Id. 
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conducting sales, the court of appeals implied that it would be unfair to 
impose the standard on firearms dealers because (1) federal legislation 
does not indicate that firearms dealers were intended to bear a duty to in-
vestigate, and (2) even reasonable firearms dealers could be liable in cas-




To the contrary, the Kansas Supreme Court found that the court of 
appeals erred in limiting Wood and Long to situations where gun owners 
failed to prevent minors from accessing their guns.
79
  The supreme court 
reasoned that comment b of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 298 
does not instruct that there should be a limit to the rule that firearms al-
ways require their controller to exercise the highest degree of care.
80
 
The supreme court also asserted that because the degree of care 
standard is interconnected with the foreseeability of harm,
81
 firearms 
sellers are subject to a higher degree of care than, for example, a marble 
seller, because it is “more foreseeable that a firearm may cause serious 
injury” than would a marble, whose dealer is subject to a lower standard 
of care.
82
  The court strongly stated that it would not shy away from its 
prior holdings that firearms carry with them a duty to exercise the highest 
degree of care in preventing those considered too incompetent to use 
them from possessing them.
83
  Supporting its ruling, the court reasoned 
that the legislature has determined that convicted felons are at special 
risk to misuse firearms, so it follows that a firearms dealer must exercise 
the highest degree of care to prevent felons from purchasing firearms.
84
 
E. Laws Applicable to Kansas Firearms Dealers 
In addition to satisfying the requisite standard of care, firearms deal-
ers must comply with gun control legislation.  Among the chief purposes 
of federal gun control legislation is “to deny access to firearms to certain 
classes of individuals deemed to constitute more of a threat to the com-
munity” than the general population.
85
 
                                                          
 78.  Id. at 155–56. 
 79.  Shirley v. Glass, 308 P.3d 1, 9 (Kan. 2013). 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id. (citing South v. McCarter, 119 P.3d 1, 13–14 (2005)). 
 82.  Id. (citing Jacoves v. United Merch. Corp., 9 Cal. App. 4th 88, 116 (1992)). 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  W. A. Harrington, Annotation, Lawfulness of Sale or Other Disposition of Firearms or 
Ammunition Under 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(d), 34 A.L.R. FED. 430, § 2(a) (1977). 
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The Gun Control Act of 1968 requires firearms dealers to obtain a li-
cense under § 923(a) in order to sell firearms.
86
  The Act prohibits deal-
ers licensed under the Gun Control Act from selling firearms to individu-
als who fall into proscribed categories.
87
  Section 922 of the Act provides 
that it is illegal for a dealer to sell a firearm to anyone he has “reasonable 
cause to believe” is a felon; “a fugitive from justice”; a controlled sub-
stance user or addict; a person who “has been adjudicated as a mental de-
fective or has been committed to any mental institution”; an illegal alien; 
a person who was dishonorably discharged from the Armed Forces; a 
person who has renounced his U.S. citizenship; a person who has a re-
straining order against him for “harassing, stalking, or threatening an in-
timate partner” or the intimate partner’s child; or a person who “has been 
convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.”
88
 
However, “there is no mandatory verification procedure regarding 
sales or dispositions with respect to the status of an individual (for exam-
ple, a felon or a narcotic addict) barred from receiving firearms under the 
statute,” except that a dealer must require the customer to complete 
Transaction Record Form 4473.
89
  The purpose of Form 4473 is to de-
termine whether a firearms purchaser is legally able to purchase a fire-
arm.
90
  The dealer must ensure that the purchaser includes his name, sex, 
address, date and place of birth, height, weight, race, citizenship, home 
state, and a “certification by the [purchaser] that [he] is not prohibited by 
the Act from . . . receiving a firearm.”
91
  After the purchaser completes 
the form, the dealer must verify the purchaser’s identity by inspecting the 
purchaser’s “identification document,”
92
 for example, his driver’s li-
cense.
93
  Then, the dealer must perform a “background check” by con-
tacting the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) 
and providing the purchaser’s information.
94
  The dealer may transfer the 
firearm to the purchaser only if the NICS informs the dealer that “it has 
no information that receipt of the firearm by the transferee would be in 
violation of Federal or State law,”
95
 or if three days have elapsed and 
                                                          
 86.  18 U.S.C. § 923(a) (2004). 
 87.  Id. § 922(d).  
 88.  Id. § 922(d)(1)–(9).  
 89.  Harrington, supra note 85, at § 2(b); 27 C.F.R. §478.124 (2010). 
 90.  27 C.F.R. §478.124 (2010). 
 91.  Id. §478.124(c)(1). 
 92.  27 C.F.R. § 478.11 (2012).   
 93.  27 C.F.R. §478.124(c)(3)(i) (2010). 
 94.  27 C.F.R. § 478.102(a) (2008). 
 95.  Id. § 478.102(a)(2)(i). 
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III.  ANALYSIS 
Before turning to the prudence and effects of Shirley’s holding that 
Kansas firearms dealers’ conduct must meet the highest degree of care, it 
is helpful to acknowledge that the Shirley defendants clearly were not 
conducting business in a safe manner.  The defendants did not uphold 
their duties and should be held liable for their failures.  The author also 
acknowledges that many preventable firearm tragedies occur each year 
and empathizes with the victims.  However, cognizant of the many re-
sponsible firearms dealers in the marketplace, a heavy heart should not 
blindly pin the tail of liability on a prudent dealer simply because he was 
a party to a transaction far removed from the ultimate tragedy.  Just as 
bad facts make bad law, it is unfair to use firearms dealers as a vehicle 
for remedying public harms where our laws, public officials, or other in-
stitutions fall short. 
Public policy and common sense mandate laws that require dealers 
to operate safely.  However, policy and common sense also dictate that 
merchants should have a real opportunity to continue their trade.  A law 
authorizing free-for-all firearms sales would be ill-advised; but a legal 
scheme espousing the legality of firearms sales while simultaneously im-
posing liability through a back door degree of care mechanism is equally 
irrational.  The law should reflect the middle ground between safety and 
practicality in firearms transactions.  As long as the legislature continues 
to authorize firearm sales, the blame flowing from a bad sale should fall 
on only the blameworthy parties. 
When considering which care standard achieves fair and desired re-
sults, it is important to be mindful of the four  elements of a negligent en-
trustment claim.
97
  In a negligent entrustment claim against a firearms 
dealer, the plaintiff is likely to have the least difficulty establishing three 
of these elements: (1) the defendant entrusted a chattel (2) to an incom-
petent trustee (3) who through his incompetent use of the chattel hurt 
somebody. 
                                                          
 96.  Id. § 478.102(a)(2)(ii). 
 97.  Martell v. Driscoll, 302 P.3d 375, 382 (Kan. 2013) (“(1) an entrustment of a chattel, (2) to 
an incompetent entrustee, (3) with knowledge or reason to know of the entrustee’s incompetence 
and, (4) the entrustee’s incompetence while using the chattel is the cause in fact of injury or damage 
to the entrustee and/or another.”). 
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First, entrustment is easy to prove.  The plaintiff must simply 
demonstrate that a sale occurred, a fact that is not likely to be disputed 
when there is proof of a sale (i.e., the required documentation that ac-
companies a firearm transfer or a sales receipt). 
Second, as to establishing the entrustee’s incompetence, two factors 
ease the plaintiff’s burden: the “hindsight bias” phenomenon and the ad-
missibility of character evidence.  Hindsight bias “describes the tendency 
of actors to overestimate the ex ante prediction that they had concerning 
the likelihood of an event’s occurrence after learning that it actually did 
occur.”
98
  Jurors, equipped with hindsight bias by nature, will hear evi-
dence about the entrustee’s reputation and prior acts.
99
  As Professor 
Geoffrey Rapp explains, “[e]xpecting juries and judges to overcome their 
own hindsight bias is demonstrably unscientific.”
100
  So, even if the en-
trustee’s reputation and prior acts alone do not warrant his categorization 
as incompetent, jurors by nature cannot resist considering the entrustee’s 
tortious act that harmed the plaintiff when finding whether or not the en-
trustee was incompetent at the time the entrustment occurred (i.e., before 
the harm at issue in the claim occurred).
101
  Because “hindsight bias will 
lead juries . . . to find defendants liable more frequently than if” their 
analysis were on “an ex ante basis . . . [,] plaintiffs will win cases they 
deserve to lose.”
102
  Hindsight bias necessitates the fact that “the greatest 
advantage of basing an action on the theory of negligent entrustment is 
that [character] evidence of specific prior acts of negligence of the en-
trustee, as well as evidence of his general reputation for traits which 
show his incompetence, is admissible.”
103
 
Lastly, there would be no claim if someone were not injured.  Plain-
tiffs generally would not choose to incur the costs of litigation if there 
was no injury.  As with entrustment, this element is not likely to be dis-
                                                          
 98.  Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Ra-
tionality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1095 (2000) (citation omit-
ted).  
 99.  See Jimmie E. Tinsley, 2 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D 651, § 2 (Bancroft-Whitney Com-
pany ed., rev. 2014) (citation omitted) (explaining that the entrustee’s reputation and prior acts are 
admissible to prove his incompetence, along with “his intoxication, his incapacity due to a physical 
or mental defect, his propensity for recklessness, or his inexperience, due to age or some other rea-
son, in use of the chattel”). 
 100.  Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, The Wreckage of Recklessness, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 111, 160 
(2008) (“Expecting juries and judges to overcome their own hindsight bias is demonstrably unscien-
tific.”). 
 101.  See id.  
 102.  Id. at 159. 
 103.  Tinsley, supra note 99, at § 4. 
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puted. 
This illustrates that the crucial element of the claim is the fourth: 
whether the firearm dealer knew or had reason to know that the purchas-
er was incompetent.  The degree of care to which firearms dealers are 
held has the greatest bearing on this element because it determines how 
exhaustive a firearms dealer’s inquiry must be for him to not have had 
reason to know of the entrustee’s incompetence. 
Because imposing the highest degree of care on firearms dealers 
conducting sales is likely to be outcome determinative in negligent en-
trustment claims against them, the danger that blameless dealers will 
shoulder unwarranted liability is better characterized as an inevitable re-
ality than as a potential risk.  The court of appeals was correct when it 
distinguished Shirley and firearms sales from cases involving firearm 
storage and usage.  The highest degree of care standard is impractical, 
unattainable, unnecessary, and will expose blameless dealers to unwar-
ranted liability.  The ordinary degree of care standard should apply to 
Kansas firearms dealers conducting sales because it imposes liability 
where appropriate without exposing prudent, blameless firearms dealers 
to unwarranted liability (as the highest degree of care standard does). 
A. The Court of Appeals Correctly Distinguished Wood and Long from 
the Facts of Shirley 
The Kansas Supreme Court disagreed with the Kansas Court of Ap-
peals’ drawing of a distinction between Shirley and Wood and Long 
based on the differences between firearms cases addressing parental au-
thority and those addressing the responsibilities of a merchant.
104
  The 
supreme court instructed that Wood’s holding was not so limited.  Ra-
ther, the supreme court asserted that Wood stood for the principle that “a 
defendant is held to the highest standard of care ‘when dealing with a 
dangerous instrumentality,’” based on the principle “that the law requires 
one to be as cautious as reasonably possible when dealing with an object 
that has obviously lethal capabilities.”
105
 
However, the supreme court got it wrong.  The court of appeals’ dis-
tinction was correct.  The same degree of care should not be applied to 
two dissimilar situations simply because they involve firearms.  Wood 
and Long involved simple negligence claims and addressed a private 
                                                          
 104.  Shirley v. Glass, 308 P.3d 1, 9 (Kan. 2013). 
 105.  Id. (citing Wood v. Groh, 7 P.3d 1163, 1168 (Kan. 2000)). 
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firearm owner’s insufficient storage of his firearms, a completely differ-
ent factual situation from dealers conducting firearm sales.  The charac-
teristics and conventions of firearm sales vastly differ from those of fire-
arm storage and use, and the Restatement (Second) of Torts does not 
suggest that the degree of care applicable to the dissimilar situations 
should be the same. 
1. The Storage of Firearms is Distinct from the Sale of Firearms 
In Wood and Long, the supreme court focused on an owner’s duty to 
exercise the highest degree of care in storing a firearm, and did not con-
sider the applicability of the standard to a consumer transaction.  A fire-
arms dealer, as the owner of a firearm, should exercise the same high de-
gree of care in storing his stock of firearms as any other firearm owner.  
However, a dealer’s storage of his stock differs from the sale thereof, and 
so should the degree of care required. 
In Long, a minor unscrewed his father’s gun-cabinet compartment, 
obtained his .357 Magnum handgun and bullets, and used them to shoot 
another teenager to death.
106
  Like the supreme court would do in Wood 
two years later, the Long court identified the issue as whether the owner 
of a handgun—a dangerous instrumentality—must “exercise the highest 
degree of care in safeguarding it.”
107
  Ultimately, the court held that the 
handgun owner “owes the public a duty to store his .357 Magnum in a 
safe and prudent manner, taking into consideration the type of handgun, 
where the ammunition is located, and the circumstances of the gun’s 
use.”
108
  The court instructed that a jury must decide whether the owner 
fulfilled his duty to exercise the highest degree of care in storing the fire-
arm.
109
  The Long court left untouched the question of what degree of 
care a firearms dealer must exercise in selling firearms, and rather exam-
ined the particulars of firearm storage and their impact on the owner’s 
storage duty. 
Likewise, the supreme court’s holding in Wood narrowly addressed 
the storage of firearms, and the case did not involve a firearm sale.  In 
Wood, a 15-year-old boy broke into his father’s secured gun cabinet and 
obtained an empty handgun and ammunition clip.
110
  He took it to a 
                                                          
 106.  Long v. Turk, 962 P.2d 1093, 1094–95 (Kan. 1998). 
 107.  Id. at 1096 (emphasis added). 
 108.  Id. at 1098 (emphasis added). 
 109.  Id. at 1099. 
 110.  Wood v. Groh, 7 P.3d 1163, 1166 (Kan. 2000). 
  
1416 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
drinking party, where the handgun accidentally discharged and struck his 
friend in the buttocks.
111
  The Wood court noted that “[t]he factual issue 
to be decided by the jury was whether the [parents who owned the hand-
gun] were negligent in storing the gun.”
112
  The court analyzed storage 
only: it even differentiated between an unloaded gun stored separately 
and one stored alongside ammunition.
113
  Implying that an unloaded gun 
stored separate from ammunition might not even be a dangerous instru-
mentality, the court stated that “[s]torage of the ammunition in the same 
location as the gun in this case resulted in the gun being easily loaded 
and made it a dangerous instrumentality.”
114
  The supreme court scruti-
nized the storage of the handgun in a locked cabinet to which the owner 
retained the only key, finding it possibly insufficient because the boy 
“only had to use a screwdriver to gain access to the cabinet.”
115
 Ultimate-
ly, the Wood court held that the district court erred by finding that a 
handgun is not a dangerous instrumentality when stored in an unloaded 
state.  The Wood court further held that the district court erred in “not in-
structing the jury that the highest standard of care is required when deal-
ing with a dangerous instrumentality.”
116
  Like the Long court, the Wood 
court did not contemplate the standard of care applicable to a firearm 
sale.  Through its highly fact-driven storage analysis, Wood answered the 
question of what degree of care an owner must exercise in storing his 
firearm, but it did not provide instruction as to what degree of care a fire-
arms dealer must exercise in selling firearms. 
Neither Wood nor Long even contemplated a firearm sale and ad-
dressed narrowly the standard of care applicable to firearm storage.  The 
cases provide no instruction upon what degree of care should apply to the 
sale of a firearm.  The only applicability of Wood and Long to firearm 
dealing is that dealers should exercise the highest degree of care in stor-
ing their inventory. 
The activities of storing and selling firearms have nothing in com-
mon, beyond the fact that they both involve firearms.  Storage is defined 
as “[t]he act of storing goods,”
117
 which is means “[t]o reserve for future 
                                                          
 111.  Id. at 1167. 
 112.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 113.  Id.   
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. at 1170. 
 116.  Id. at 1169. 
 117.  AM. HERITAGE COLL. DICTIONARY 1362 (4th ed. 2004). 
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use.”
118
  The question in a negligence action for insufficient storage pre-
cautions is whether a firearm owner sufficiently stored his firearm to the 
exclusion of others.
119
  As the cases instruct, whether a firearm is negli-
gently stored depends upon factors such as location, type of compart-
ment, proximity to ammunition, locking mechanism, and general charac-
teristics of the storage facility that render it secure or unsecure.
120
   
A sale, on the other hand, is defined as “[t]he exchange of goods or 
services for an amount of money or its equivalent; the act of selling.”
121
  
Distinct from a negligent storage scenario (in which the firearm is likely 
taken against the owner’s will or at least without his knowledge and su-
pervision), a sale involves a merchant voluntarily vending a firearm to 
another person.  Whether a firearm dealer’s sale was sufficiently safe 
would not depend on how he stored the firearm before the sale.  It would 
depend on a completely different set of factors, such as whether he con-
ducted a background check and heeded any indications that the buyer 
was not competent to execute the purchase.   
Clearly neither Wood nor Long are controlling, but they also are not 
instructive of the degree of care applicable to the sale of firearms.  Thus, 
the court of appeals properly distinguished firearm storage from firearm 
sales, and wisely considered the differing circumstances of firearms sales 
in refusing to apply the highest degree of care to firearms dealers con-
ducting sales. 
2.  The Restatement (Second) of Torts Does Not Imply That the Highest 
Degree of Care Applies to Firearm Sales 
In Shirley, the supreme court supported its extension of Wood and 
Long to firearms sales by citing comment b of the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 298 as support for the proposition that the highest degree of 
care always applies to those in control of firearms.
122
  Comment b states: 
The care required is always reasonable care.  This standard never var-
ies, but the care which it is reasonable to require of the actor varies with 
the danger involved in his act, and is proportionate to it.  The greater 
the danger, the greater the care which must be exercised. 
                                                          
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Wood, 7 P.3d at 1169 (“The factual issue to be decided by the jury was whether the Grohs 
were negligent in storing the gun.”). 
 120.  See, e.g., Wood, 7 P.3d at 1166; Long v. Turk, 962 P.2d 1093, 1094–95 (Kan. 1998).  
 121.  AM. HERITAGE COLL. DICTIONARY 1224 (4th ed. 2004). 
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As in all cases where the reasonable character of the actor’s conduct is 
in question, its utility is to be weighed against the magnitude of the risk 
which it involves. (See § 291.)  The amount of attention and caution re-
quired varies with the magnitude of the harm likely to be done if care is 
not exercised, and with the utility of the act.  Therefore, if the act has 
little or no social value and is likely to cause any serious harm, it is rea-
sonable to require close attention and caution.  So too, if the act in-
volves a risk of death or serious bodily harm, and particularly if it is 
capable of causing such results to a number of persons, the highest at-
tention and caution are required even if the act has a very considerable 
utility.  Thus those who deal with firearms, explosives, poisonous 
drugs, or high tension electricity are required to exercise the closest at-
tention and the most careful precautions, not only in preparing for their 
use but in using them.  Likewise, a driver approaching a railway cross-
ing is required, for the protection of his passengers, to take precautions 
to ascertain whether a train is approaching, which would be unduly 




Comment b, like Wood and Long, does not contemplate a firearm 
sale, but rather firearm usage.
124
  The supreme court reasoned that 
“[c]omment b suggests that no such limitation is necessary” on the high-
est degree of care’s applicability to any situation involving a firearm.
125
  
However, the court should not have inferred from comment b that the 
highest degree of care applies to sales of firearms.  Comment b simply 
does not address the issue of firearm sales.  The lack of an express 
boundary in comment b to the highest degree of care’s application does 
not translate to a blanket application of that standard to any situation in-
volving a firearm.  Section 298 illustrates the principal that an actor is 
negligent if he fails to act with reasonable care—i.e., to act as a reasona-
ble person in his position would act.
126
  Comment b merely elaborates on 
what constitutes reasonable care, and on how heightened dangerousness 
may command a higher degree of care to satisfy reasonable care.
127
 
The language of comment b does not contemplate a sales transaction.  
The sentence attaching the highest attention and caution to firearms at-
taches it to their use, not their sale: “those who deal with firearms . . . not 
only in preparing for their use but in using them” must employ the high-
                                                          
 123.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 298 cmt. b (1965) (emphasis added). 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Shirley, 308 P.3d at 9. 
 126.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 298 (1965). 
 127.  Id. at cmt. b. 
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est degree of care.
128
  This sentence solidifies that the statement was di-
rected at users of firearms because it clarifies that the highest degree of 
care encompasses not only use, but also preparation for use (i.e., user ac-
tivities, not dealer activities).
129
  “With” is commonly defined as “in the 
performance, use, or operation of”
130
  while “use” typically means “[t]o 
put into service or apply for a purpose; employ.”
131
  Based on these 
common usages, selling a firearm does not fall within use.  Using a fire-
arm would entail firing it.  Similarly, preparing for use would include 
loading the firearm, transporting it, cleaning it, sighting it, and other re-
lated activities. 
One might argue that purchasing a firearm is encompassed within 
preparation for use, because a person must obtain a thing before he can 
use it.  However, that interpretation is improper because it proves too 
much.  People buy things with the intention of using them in the future, 
but they do not prepare to use them until an event occurs that triggers 
their desire to actually use the thing.  If the purchase of a chattel were 
considered a part of preparing for its use, then a firearm purchase that 
happened twenty years prior would be considered preparation for a 
shooting that occurred today—an event that was not even in the purchas-
er’s contemplation.  Additionally, the cases involving the other danger-
ous instrumentalities to which comment b refers do not involve sale of 
the goods, but the actual use of them.
132
 
Comment b certainly instructs that the highest degree of care applies 
to the use of dangerous instrumentalities, which is logical because the 
foreseeability of the danger is high.  Concededly, the sale is a necessary 
precedent to the use.  However, the sale is far removed from the actual 
use.  The danger involved in selling firearms is not as high as in firearm 
usage because a sale is several steps removed from the firing of the 
weapon.  Most all would recognize that the sale of a vehicle is not as 
dangerous as a vehicle operating on the freeway, just as the sale of a 
baseball bat is not as dangerous as a bat in full swing.  Less danger is in-
volved in firearm sales than firearm use because firearms are less capable 
of causing great foreseeable harm at the moment of sale than at the time 
of use.  It is well established that “the duty of care is intertwined with the 
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foreseeability of harm,”
133
 and that the care “require[d] of the actor varies 
with the danger involved in his act.”
134
  While the highest degree of care 
applies to the use of a firearm, it should not apply to the sale of a firearm, 
where the dangerous instrument is not yet being used. 
The supreme court’s sweeping conclusion in Shirley that the “Re-
statement principle that the law requires one to be as cautious as reason-
ably possible when dealing with an object that has obviously lethal capa-
bilities” necessitates imposing the highest degree of care on firearms 
dealers ignores the fundamental restatement principle itself: that the de-
gree of care varies based on dangerousness.
135
  If one firearm activity is 
highly dangerous, the highest degree of care should apply.  Conversely, 
if an activity involving a firearm does not entail such heightened danger-
ousness, the highest degree of care is not a practical standard. 
While the highest degree of care naturally applies to a firearm in cer-
tain contexts, it does not follow that the standard applies in all situations.  
The supreme court in Wood seems to have carefully defined only a load-
ed firearm as a dangerous instrumentality, implying that a firearm is not 
a dangerous instrumentality in its unloaded state: “[s]torage of the am-
munition in the same location as the gun in this case resulted in the gun 
being easily loaded and made it a dangerous instrumentality.”
136
  Nearly 
forty years before this quote from Wood, the Kansas Supreme Court sug-
gested that an unloaded firearm is not a dangerous instrumentality: “De-
fendant owned . . . a certain dangerous instrumentality, to-wit: A loaded 
revolver kept in defendant’s bedroom in an easily accessible location.”
137
  
That court specifically labeled a loaded firearm as dangerous, possibly 
implying that unloaded firearms belong in a different category.  Thus, the 
supreme court has acknowledged that a firearm is not a dangerous in-
strumentality in every context, such as when it is not loaded. 
If an unloaded firearm, which is no more dangerous than any heavy 
object which could theoretically be used to strike someone, does not re-
quire the highest degree of care, the underlying rationale must be that the 
threat of danger is lower than with a loaded firearm.  It follows then that 
the threat of danger in the sale of firearms is lower than in the actual use 
of firearms, and justifies a lower degree of care.  While using a firearm 
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warrants the highest degree of care, selling one does not because it does 
not pose the same threat of danger.  Other state courts have recognized 
that the degree of care required in using a firearm differs from that re-
quired in selling a firearm.  In Jacoves v. United Merchandising Corp., 
the California Court of Appeal for the Second District noted that while 
the highest degree of care applies to the “use or possession” of firearms, 
a seller must only “exercise[] the control which an ordinary person 
would reasonably exercise so as not to cause injury to another.”
138
 
In short, Section 298 does not suggest that the highest degree of care 
applies to each and every situation involving a firearm.  Rather, it stands 
for the principle that the degree of care required of an actor varies with 
the danger of his act.
139
  As comment b provides, the actual use of a fire-
arm commands the actor’s highest degree of care.  However, the activity 
of firearms sales is separate from firearm use, and the degree of care 
should diverge to meet the circumstances of the differing activities. 
B. The Highest Degree of Care Standard Imposes Unwarranted Liability 
on Prudent Dealers 
In addition to not being supported by case law, the supreme court’s 
decision to impose the highest degree of care on firearms dealers con-
ducting sales exposes prudent dealers to unwarranted liability.  Under the 
highest degree of care, there are situations where firearms dealers simply 
cannot avoid fault.  If firearms remain legal to sell, it is nonsensical to 
retroactively punish their sale.  The inherent dangerousness of firearms is 
undeniable, but it does not follow that dealers have human behavior ex-
pertise and clairvoyant abilities to discern competent users from incom-
petent users, absent discoverable indicators.  Shirley imposes an unfair 
and unattainable standard upon Kansas firearms dealers, the effect of 
which will almost certainly impose liability on responsible and blameless 
dealers. 
                                                          
 138.  11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 486–87 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).  
 139.  See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 298 (1965).  Section 298 provides:  
When an act is negligent only if done without reasonable care, the care which the actor 
is required to exercise to avoid being negligent in the doing of the act is that which a 
reasonable man in his position, with his information and competence, would recognize 
as necessary to prevent the act from creating an unreasonable risk of harm to another.  
 Id.  
  
1422 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
1. The Highest Degree of Care Standard is Unattainable 
Firearms dealers are not equipped to live up to the highest standard 
of care.  The court of appeals warned that “the ‘highest degree of care’ 
standard [] would make every licensed gun dealer negligent per se every 
time a statutorily ineligible gun purchaser, no matter how deceitful, 
bought a firearm.”
140
  The court presented two examples in which “[n]o 
resources exist for a firearms dealer to use to catch a deceitful gun buy-
er”: (1) a deceitful straw-purchaser who gives off no indication that the 
firearm is meant for another person, and (2) a purchaser who was previ-
ously “adjudicated mentally defective.”
141
  In both examples, “the ‘high-
est degree of care’ standard would establish negligence in situations 
where a reasonable firearms dealer would have no idea that the gun buy-
er is . . . incompetent.”
142
  The result of a responsible and careful firearms 
dealer being held liable for something he could not possibly prevent is 
more than undesirable, it is antithetical to the fundamental principles of 
justice. 
The court of appeals also cautioned that such a standard would “im-
pose a duty on a firearms dealer to investigate almost every firearms 
transaction because just requiring the purchaser to fill out, initial, and 
certify [ATF Form 4473] would be insufficient to meet the ‘highest de-
gree of care.’”
143
  The court of appeals hypothesized that a dealer might 
be required to 
investigate whether the firearms purchaser had other people living in 
the home, whether those people had any violent tendencies or prior fel-
ony convictions, whether there were any children in the home, whether 
the purchaser had a secure gun cabinet in which to lock away his gun, 




One could make a strong argument that asking such questions would 
be a good practice for all firearms dealers, and could possibly prevent 
tragedies.  However, the reality is that these questions were hypothesized 
by a seasoned court with the benefit of hindsight.  Firearms legislation 
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has equipped firearms dealers with ATF Form 4473, which will help 
them determine if a customer is statutorily ineligible,
145
 and  not a list of 
probing questions which might assist the dealer in uncovering signs of 
incompetency.  It is unrealistic to believe that the tools firearms dealers 
possess—ATF Form 4473 and sensory perception—will equip them to 
accurately predict whether each and every customer is competent to pos-
sess a firearm. 
Firearms dealer expertise lies in firearm stock and salesmanship, not 
behavioral science or detection of hidden agendas.  If a purchaser fills 
out ATF Form 4473, presents appropriate identification, passes the back-
ground check, and displays no readily apparent warning signs, the fire-
arms dealer should be free to complete the transaction without fear of re-
course.  With hindsight bias, one might disingenuously propose a 
precautionary measure that would have uncovered the incompetence, 
when in all reality a reasonable dealer was helpless to stop the tragic re-
sult.  In short, if the end goal is greater safety in firearms transactions, 
the means are to provide firearms dealers with the tools to achieve that 
goal, not to manufacture a care standard that provides relief after the fact, 
at the expense of the easiest scapegoat. 
The Kansas Supreme Court did not address the concerns raised by 
the court of appeals, and merely shrugged off the threat of unwarranted 
liability for gun dealers by noting that the “fear [of virtually unlimited 
liability for gun owners] has proven unfounded.”
146
  The court supported 
its assertion that there is no threat of unwarranted liability by noting that 
“Kansas courts have not been subject to a deluge of cases asserting neg-
ligent entrustment by gun owners as a result of the requirement that gun 
owners exercise great caution in allowing access to their weapons.”
147
  
The problem with this assertion is that it has not yet been clear that neg-
ligent entrustment applied to firearms sales as Shirely is the first case to 
do so.  So, until now, plaintiffs and their lawyers were unaware of the vi-
ability of bringing negligent entrustment claims in response to firearms 
tragedies. 
The cases that the supreme court relied on in Shirley, Wood and  
Long were not actions for negligent entrustment in the firearms sales 
context; they were simple negligence actions against private firearm 
owners for failure to securely store their firearms.  So, whether or not 
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there has been a “deluge” of negligence claims against firearms owners 
for not sufficiently storing their firearms is irrelevant to whether firearms 
dealers are now at great risk of being held liable for not meeting the 
highest degree of care in selling firearms.  Moreover, before Shirley, the 
case in which the Kansas Court of Appeals came closest to recognizing 
negligent entrustment with respect to the sale of a chattel involved the 
sale of a firearm to a troubled boy who used it to commit suicide.
148
  
Hence, the opinion’s assertion that there has not yet been a “deluge of 
cases asserting negligent entrustment by gun owners”
149
 provides scant 
reassurance to firearms dealers regarding the risk of continuing their 
trade.  If negligent entrustment claims for the sale of firearms were at-
tempted before Shirley recognized negligent entrustment in the firearms 
sales context, a “deluge of cases” is likely now that the supreme court 
has not only opened the door, but imposed a standard that makes estab-
lishing negligence easy. 
Unless firearms dealers are furnished with the tools that make per-
forming up to the highest degree of care feasible, the imposition of the 
highest degree of care standard will serve as a mechanism to hold blame-
less dealers liable for harms they were incapable of preventing.  The 
Kansas Court of Appeals was right to refuse to apply the highest degree 
of care to firearms dealers conducting sales. 
2. The Highest Degree of Care Standard Imposes Unwarranted Liability 
Unwarranted liability follows from an unattainable standard of care.  
The highest degree of care should not apply to firearms dealers because it 
imposes liability on wholly innocent and prudent dealers. 
In Wood, the court reversed the defense verdict because there was a 
real chance that the jury would have found differently if they had been 
instructed on the correct standard.
150
  The supreme court held that the ju-
ry could have found differently under the high standard of care because 
while locking a gun cabinet might easily satisfy ordinary care, the jury 
could have found that the parents did not exercise the highest degree of 
care because their gun cabinet could be breached by a prying screw driv-
er.
151
  The dissent warned that applying the highest degree of care to gun 
                                                          
 148.  Estate of Pemberton v. John’s Sports Ctr., Inc., 135 P.3d 174, 187–91 (Kan. Ct. App. 
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storage “makes it almost absolute liability to own a gun,” and asked 
“[w]hat more can a gun owner do than lock up an unloaded gun and keep 
[the only] key.”
152
  Similarly, in Long, the court found that a jury could 
find the owner’s firearm storage insufficient because his gun cabinet 
could be taken apart by removing the screws.
153
 
If securing a firearm by lock and holding the only key can potentially 
fail to meet the highest degree of care standard in gun storage, then it fol-
lows that firearm dealers face enormous challenges in complying with 
the standard when conducting sales.  Firearms dealers at the very least 
will be subjected to litigation expenses because the high standard effec-
tively precludes the court from granting summary judgment.  The result 
in the firearm storage cases is defensible because the owner has complete 
control over his storage.  One is able to assess an inanimate storage de-
vice for its sufficiency.  However, a firearms dealer has no control over 
his customers, and is ill-equipped to predict their behavior absent readily 
apparent warning signs. 
3. The Ordinary Degree-of-Care Standard Imposes Liability in 
Appropriate Circumstances 
While the highest degree of care has the negative impact of imposing 
liability on responsible dealers, it does not affect the imposition of liabil-
ity on blameworthy dealers who would escape under an ordinary degree 
of care.  An ordinary degree of care standard imposes liability in appro-




                                                          
 152.  Id. at 1173 (Abbott, J., dissenting).  
 153.  Long v. Turk, 962 P.2d 1093, 1095, 1100 (Kan. 1998). 
 154.  See, e.g., Bernethy v. Walt Failor’s, Inc., 653 P.2d 280, 283 (Wash. 1982) (en banc) (im-
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1261 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (considering a negligent entrustment claim in storage, not sale, con-
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safeguarding his weapon,” and that reasonable care applied). 
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Under the facts of Shirley, the pawn shop owners clearly failed to 
exercise ordinary care.  That case involved an obvious straw-person sale: 
even though the 77-year-old grandmother completed the ATF form, Gra-
ham, who had readily admitted to the store owners that he was a felon, 
picked out a shotgun, provided the money for the purchase, and carried 
the gun out of the shop.  Under those circumstances, no reasonable fire-
arms dealer would have believed that the gun was not ultimately being 
purchased for Graham.  Nevertheless, the Shirley firearms dealers turned 
a blind eye.  The Shirley dealers are culpable, and their selling techniques 
fall far below the exercise of ordinary care, constituting an intentional 
illegal firearm sale.  The ordinary degree of care standard already impos-
es liability on firearms dealers like the ones in Shirley.  There is no need 
to elevate the standard so as to snag wholly innocent, prudent dealers 
along with the negligent ones, when the ordinary care standard already 




The ordinary degree of care standard imposes liability on firearms 
dealers who have failed to do what is in their power to protect the public 
from incompetent persons with firearms.  The higher standard does no 
more than the ordinary standard to hold irresponsible dealers accounta-
ble, but instead exposes responsible dealers to unwarranted liability.  The 
higher standard provides the public with no more protection from the 
danger of incompetent persons with firearms because it is unattainable in 
the first place—firearms dealers cannot predict that a seemingly well-
adjusted person without a criminal background will use the purchase to 
inflict harm on others.  The supreme court was wrong to impose the 
highest degree of care on firearms dealers conducting sales, and as a con-
sequence, prudent and blameless dealers will be swept up along with the 
negligent ones (who would already be held liable under the ordinary care 
standard).  Ultimately, the imposition of the highest degree of care on 
firearms dealers conducting sales will only result in unwarranted liabil-
ity, not fewer tragedies.  Therefore, because the highest degree of care 
                                                          
 155.  Compare Howard Bros. of Phenix City, Inc. v. Penley, 492 So. 2d 965, 969 (Miss. 1986) 
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standard harms more innocent people than it will protect, it should be 
abandoned. 
 
